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Can Environmental Regulation of X-Inefficient Firms
Create a “Double Dividend”?
Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of environmental policies on environmental quality and on
economic welfare. Its point of departure is Michael Porter’s hypothesis that environmental
regulation may actually raise enterprises’ productivity through “innovation offsets”. We first
review Porter’s arguments and the ensuing discussion with his critics. Then we develop a
variation of Porter’s theme by investigating environmental policies in a model with “rationally
X-inefficient” firms. The term “rationally” X-inefficient is used to designate a setup where X-
inefficiency does not necessarily arise out of irrationality or “human weakness”. Rather, it
arises out of the institutional separation of firms’ ownership and management, where managers
act as agents for the owners, who are the principals. Under this setting managers will pursue at
least partially their personal objectives which cannot be expected to be perfectly congruent
with the principals’ objectives of profit maximization or cost minimization. This conflict
between agents and principals is the source of X-inefficiencies in our model. We proceed with
investigating the impact of government regulation. For this, we integrate the X-inefficiency in a
model with imperfect competition in the product market. The “green” perspective enters
through the assumption that one of the factors of production generates pollution. We
investigate two types of policies, (i) regulatory policy of the “command-and-control” type,
where the government directly requires the firms to use a certain environmentally friendlier
technology and (ii) tax policy, where the government imposes a tax on the polluting production
factor thus attempting to diminish its use. We show that environmental regulation of the
command-and-control type can raise the efficiency of the allocation by putting pressure on
firms to improve X-efficiency. The same policy can also be expected to improve
environmental quality, thus generating a “double dividend”. We also show that a traditional tax
policy generates the same “double dividend”. However, it may be less effective in improving
welfare.
JEL-Classification: Q 20, L 1, D 2IWH ___________________________________________________________________
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1. Introduction
This paper investigates the impact of environmental policies on environmental quality and on
economic welfare. The point of departure is Michael Porter’s (1991) conjecture that
environmental regulation could raise enterprises’ productivity through “innovation offsets”.
Porter claimed that government policies which either directly required enterprises to cut back
pollution or which made pollution financially unpalatable could induce enterprises to develop
new technologies with higher resource productivity and that this in turn could more than offset
the costs imposed on them by the government policies. The objective of this paper is to
investigate this conjecture in the context of a formal economic model with imperfect
competition. In fact, the paper presents a slight variation of Porter’s theme, his focus being on
technological efficiency, ours on X-efficiency (on the level of individual firms) and on market
efficiency (on the aggregate level).
The paper proceeds as follows. In the following section Porter’s arguments and the ensuing
discussion with his critics are reviewed. We also discuss the connection between his
conjecture and the theory of X-inefficiency. In section 3, a model with imperfect competition in
the product market and “rationally X-inefficient” firms is developed which serves as the vehicle
for investigating Porter’s hypothesis. The term “rationally” X-inefficient is used to designate a
setup where X-inefficiency does not necessarily arise out of irrationality or “human weakness”.
Rather, it arises out of the institutional separation of firms’ ownership and management, where
managers act as agents for the owners, who are the principals. In such a setup managers will
pursue at least in part their personal objectives which cannot be expected to be perfectly
congruent with the principals’ objectives of profit maximization or cost minimization
(Kamecke, 1993). This conflict between agents and principals is the source of X-
inefficiencies. As it was already pointed out above, the arguments in this section are somewhat
different from Porter’s. Whereas he focuses on improvements in technological efficiency, the
focus of this paper lies on reductions of X-inefficiency inside individual firms and on the
resulting improvements in market efficiency. In the following section, however, the thrust of the
arguments coincides again with Porter’s, the common theme being that by putting pressure on
firms the government can “compel” them to become more efficient.
In section 4 the impact of government regulation is analysed. The “green” perspective enters
through the assumption that one of the factors of production generates pollution. Government
policies which affect the number of firms in the market, their output or their factor input will
therefore impact both on aggregate emissions and on market efficiency. Starting from a
benchmark case where market entry is deterred through X-inefficiency we investigate two
types of policies, (i) regulatory policy of the “command-and-control” type, where the
government directly requires the firms to use a certain environmentally friendlier technology
and (ii) tax policy, where the government imposes a tax on the polluting production factor thus
attempting to diminish its use. It is shown that a command-and-control policy may – under
certain conditions – improve both environmental quality and market efficiency, the key reason
being that it puts pressure on firms and alters X-efficiency. We also show that a traditional tax
policy generates the same “double dividend”. However, it may be less effective in improving
welfare.___________________________________________________________________ IWH
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2. Can environmental regulation improve competitiveness?
a. The Porter hypothesis
Porter was the first to raise the question whether environmental policy could be beneficial for
the performance of domestic enterprises. In his 1991 article he argued that environmental
regulation in one country could enhance the competitiveness of firms in this country even if – or
rather, exactly if – it was more stringent than the regulation faced by competitors in other
countries. Properly designed environmental policy measures could induce innovation within
firms which would otherwise be not undertaken. The realization of these innovation
opportunities would create net savings for these firms which he referred to as “innovation
offsets”. This claim became subsequently known as the “Porter hypothesis”.
In their 1995 paper, Porter and van der Linde went on to illustrate this idea in greater detail
and to underpin it with empirical examples. Their central message is that competition between
enterprises is not a static phenomenon but a dynamic one. New technological production
possibilities constantly arise over time of which firms are not completely aware because of
incomplete information, deficiencies in organizational structure or because of internal control
problems. They also argue that, from the point of view of individual firms, the benefits from
environmental innovation are uncertain. For this reason firms hesitate to innovate in this
direction. In this context, tough environmental regulation could provide firms with the incentive
to search for new technologies.
Innovations could regard production processes as well as product properties. Porter and van
der Linde expect innovation offsets especially from the first type of innovations because the
resulting increases in productivity and/or resource efficiency could lead to cost savings and
enhanced performance of the firms compared to international competitors. Additional positive
effects on international competitiveness could result from first mover advantages.
Critical for the innovation offsets claimed by Porter and van der Linde is the design of the
policy instruments. Authorities should use instruments based on market incentives and
instruments which stress pollution prevention rather than the abatement of pollution. Essential in
this regard is that the instruments do not act as a constraint on technological development and
that a maximum degree of freedom remains for firms to implement new technologies by
innovation. However, regulation has to be stringent enough to induce innovation and innovation
offsets. If regulation is too lax, it can be dealt with incrementally or only through abatement in
the context of the existing technologies.
Porter’s hypothesis induced a lively debate. Its validity was questioned in several ways.
Among others, Palmer, Oates and Portney (1995) criticize Porter and van der Linde for
implicitly assuming that the private sector systematically overlooks profitable opportunities for
innovation and that the regulatory authority is in a position to correct this “market failure”, thus
helping firms increasing their profits. They find this unconvincing and, as a counter-argument,
present a simple static model with incentive-based regulation. A representative firm operates in
perfectly competitive markets. There is neither slack nor X-inefficiency nor strategic interaction
between the polluting firms and the regulating authority. Tighter regulation in this case always
leads to reduced profits, which contradicts the Porter hypothesis. Additionally, Palmer et al.IWH ___________________________________________________________________
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contrast the real-world firm-specific examples on innovation offsets presented by Porter and
van der Linde with aggregated US data. Estimates by the U.S. Commerce Department’s
Bureau of Economic Analysis show that, in 1992, expenditures by U.S. firms on environmental
protection, net of offsets, have amounted to at least $ 100 billion. This suggests innovation
offsets are a long way from compensating for the costs of regulation. Other critics have arrived
at similar conclusions. Positive effects of environmental regulation on profits could be obtained
only as very special cases.1
However, in a different theoretical setting than the one used by Palmer et al. it is possible to
derive other conclusions, namely that environmental regulation may indeed raise domestic
firms’ competitiveness in the world market. Some recent contributions which are best
summarized under the heading of “strategic environmental policy” allow for imperfectly
competitive markets with strategic behavior of the agents. Under specific circumstances –
depending e.g. on the nature of the behavior of the firms, the market structure, the number of
market participants or the composition of the capital stock – strict environmental standards
(where strict means that the marginal costs of abatement exceeds the marginal environmental
damage) act as means to shift profits from foreign to domestic enterprises.2 For instance, this
occurs in an international duopoly when enterprises compete by setting prices (Bertrand
competition). Strong emission standards raise marginal costs and hence the price of the
commodity. In response, the foreign firm raises its price as well, resulting in higher demand for
the domestically produced good and in higher profits for the domestic firm. Unfortunately, this
conclusion is not robust to changes in the nature of the game. If Cournot competition is
assumed, the result could be reversed. Various models have been formulated in which
”environmental dumping”, i.e. a lower-than-social-cost regulation, appears to be optimal in the
sense that profit shifting becomes possible.3 This serves as an indirect subsidy to the domestic
firms. But again, this result critically depends on the underlying assumptions. Thus an equal-to-
social-cost regulation appears to be optimal if industry size is treated as endogenous, demand
is approximately linear, no severe entry barriers exist, and pollution cannot be abated (as is the
case for CO2).4
b. The role of X-inefficiency
The idea that innovation offsets could result from a reduction of X-inefficiency has already
been mentioned in the literature5, albeit without formal proof. Indeed, it provides one possible
explanation for Porter’s claim that regulatory pressure by the government could induce firms to
realize hitherto unexploited opportunities for innovation and productivity increases. The term
X-efficiency – the converse of X-inefficiency – was coined by Leibenstein (1966) who also
discussed various reasons for X-inefficiencies to arise. From the beginning, the notion of X-
                                                
1 See e.g. Simpson/Bradford (1996), Ulph (1997).
2 See e.g. Barrett (1994), Rauscher (1997), Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (1998), and Schmutzler (1998).
3 See e.g. Barrett (1994), Kennedy (1994), Ulph (1996), Rauscher (1997).
4 See Requate (1997).
5 See Oates/Palmer/Portney (1994), p. 16ff., Rauscher (1997), p. 191, Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagné (1998).___________________________________________________________________ IWH
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efficiency or X-inefficiency has been subject to a controversial discussion. Its underlying
assumptions are – as critics have put it – inconsistent: On the one hand, maximization is
rejected as a tool to predict individual behavior, on the other hand agents are assumed to
maximize some objective.6
A new view was introduced by Kamecke (1993) who showed that X-inefficient behavior
could arise under “neoclassical” assumptions. He uses a principal-agent model where a
manager acts as the agent for the firms’s owner, the principal. He shows that the manager may
rationally decide not to minimize long-run costs and thus act “inefficiently” from the point of
view of an outside observer. The reason for this behavior lies in the employment contract of
the manager (an insider with relatively high productivity) which is binding only for one period.
In the second period he could be replaced by a rival (an outsider with lower productivity).
Through overinvestment in the first period the incumbent manager eliminates the chances of the
rival to replace him and run the firm profitably. Only intensifying competition in the output
market can force the manager to reduce overinvestment. A larger number of competitors
reduces profits and the remaining scope for overinvestment. In complete markets all the profits
are competed away and the firms are organized efficiently.
Kamecke’s model is a key component of our own model in the following section. We
construct a model with an X-inefficient monopolistic firm and endogenous market entry of an
efficient rival. Both firms are subject to environmental regulation which raises their production
costs. Thus the incentive of the manager of the monopolistic firm to overinvest is reduced. This
answers one criticism levelled against Porter’s hypothesis, namely, why should the government
be able to push firms to exploit hitherto unexploited opportunities for productivity increases?
Our answer is that government policies effectively “stiffen” cost pressure and thus diminishes
the scope to behave inefficiently.
3. The model
a. Basic structure of the model
The temporal setup of the analysis is as follows (c.f. Figure 1): In period 0 the owner of a firm
with a monopolistic position in an entry-resticted market chooses the production technology of
his firm and hires a manager who consequently decides on the production capacity.
Figure 1: Time structure of the model
                                                
6 See Kamecke (1993), p. 391.IWH ___________________________________________________________________
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Production takes place with two production factors. One, say capital, determines the capacity
of the next period. Given the amount of this factor, the other production factor is chosen in the
next period in an optimal fashion. In every period the manager chooses the capacity for the
next production period, i.e. in period 0 for period 1. We assume that capacity equals output.
In period 1 the government implements an environmental policy instrument and thus changes
the production costs of the firm. We investigate the impact of two different environmental
instruments, a production standard and a tax. After their implementation the market is
liberalized.
The benchmark case of the analysis is given by the market equilibrium after liberalization, i.e. a
situation without any policy measure. In the benchmark case we assume that market entry of a
rival firm is deterred through the X-inefficient behaviour of the incumbent. The rival is assumed
to be organized in an X-efficient way, producing a perfect substitute and behaving as a
Stackelberg-follower. This allows to analyse the impact of environmental regulation on X-
inefficiency, market strucure, and welfare. The game proceeds until period T.
b. Production and costs
The monopolistic firm uses capital K – at interest rate r – and the environmentally harmful
resource E (say, energy) – at price e – to provide capacity Z which is sold at the market price
P. Its production function is
a aK E Z
- =
1 . (1)
Capital has a delivery time of one period and must therefore be chosen one period before
production is supposed to take place. Environmental damage per unit of capacity is
characterized by the energy intensity e:
Z
E
= e . (2)
Additionally to the costs for the variable production factors, the provision of capacity Z causes























An environmentally friendlier technology (with a lower e) is assumed to go along with higher
fixed costs F and lower marginal costs g. The market demand function has the form
Z P - =1 . (4)
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We assume that the technology of the incumbent and the potential entrant and (thus) the cost
functions are identical. If the potential entrant decides to enter the market the profit function of
the incumbent becomes
F Z g Z Z Z C Z P i i p i - - - - = - = ) 1 ( p   (6)
where Zi and Zp stand for the capacity provided by the incumbent and the entrant respectively.
c. Principal-Agent problem
If firms are managed not by their owners but by managers who are employees and receive
only a partial share in profits, then the managers’ personal utility maximization may dominate
profit maximization. This could give rise to a non-optimal resource utilization and, possibly, X-
inefficiency. In the present section we introduce this type of behavior. Essentially, we use
Kamecke’s (1993) principal-agent model of X-inefficiency: The monopolistic firm’s
management is the agent acting on behalf of the firm’s owner, who is the principal. The reason
for the manager’s inefficient behavior lies in his employment contract. The contract is
incomplete in that it is binding only for one period, thus in the second period he could possibly
be replaced by a rival.7
In period 0, the owner of the monopolistic firm hires a manager who we will afterwards call
the insider-manager, whereas the other potential managers which are not hired in period 0 are
called outsiders. In the same period the manager chooses the capital stock which determines
the capacity of the next period. In period 1, the other factor of production, E, is ordered
which can be employed instantenously. The manager receives the wage w and the profit share
a of the firm’s net profit ) ˆ ( w - p , where  p ˆ  indicates the profit under X-inefficiency.8 The
manager’s pay-off is determined in every period anew.
While employed the insider-manager i reaches a higher productivity level than an outsider
which expresses itself in lower marginal costs under the insider’s management. The insider runs
the firm with the production function  ) , ( t t i E K f Z = , while an outsider  o produces
) , ( t t o E K f Z =  with  f g g i o + =  and  0 > f . However, the higher productivity level of the
insider vanishes if he has to leave the firm (which will not happen in equilibrium).
Under these assumptions, it is rational for the manager not to maximize the long run profit. To
keep his position inside the firm, he orders a larger than optimal capital stock which results in
the X-inefficient capacity.
Figure 2: Profit functions of insider- and outsider-manager
                                                
7 Therefore, two kinds of competitive situations exist in this model: On the one hand, the incumbent
competes on the output market with a potential entrant and, on the other hand, the insider-manager
competes on the job market with another kind of manager (an outsider).
8 The sign ^ characterizes the variables under X-inefficiency.IWH ___________________________________________________________________
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The behaviour of the insider leads to overinvestment  i Z ˆ , as can be seen in Figure 2.9 The
shown profit curves of insider- and outsider-manager depend on the capacity in place. The
insider’s curve lies above the outsider’s due to the lower productivity of the latter. The factor
allocation is optimal since the manager maximizes short-run profits. But in order to protect his
position the insider chooses a capacity  i Z ˆ  which is larger than the optimal capacity 
*
i Z . i Z ˆ  is
exactly the value that maximizes the difference between the profits of the insider and an
outsider. For the outsider, this capacity is too large to allow for profit making (for the analytical
proof see Appendix 2a).10
The capacity which yields a zero profit of the outsider can be derived from equation (5) with g
= go and p = 0. We get
( ) i o o o Z ˆ F ) g ( g Z = - - + - = 4 1 1
2
1 2 . (7)
The resulting profit of the monopolistic firm is
F Z g Z Z i i i i i - - - = ˆ ˆ ) ˆ 1 ( ˆ p . (8)
This is less than the maximum profit 
*
i p  which means that the insider uses part of the potential
profits to protect his position.11  i p ˆ  is the highest profit the firm can gain in this setting, and we
                                                
9 This diagram shows the case of two periods.
10 The profit-maximizing capital stock 
*
i Z  would be selected only if the maxima of the two short-run profit
functions coincided. This case is ruled out since we assumed that the insider’s and the outsider’s
productivities differ.
11 Naturally, the question arises whether the owner of the firm has to tolerate the X-inefficient behaviour
of the manager. However, the assumed “rules of the game” do not allow negotiation between owner and
manager about a reduction of overinvestment, because this would imply a commitment for two periods,
which is by assumption not possible.
If the assumption of X-inefficient behaviour of the management is abandoned, it can be shown that
monetary incentives can be used to induce an environmentally friendlier behaviour of the management.


















i i ˆ gp p =  with  [ ] 1 0, ˛ g . The ratio g can be interpreted as a measure of the “degree” of
X-efficiency.12 The larger  g, the smaller is the distortion resulting from the manager’s
behaviour.
d. Market equilibrium
As a benchmark case for the analysis in the following sections we now consider the welfare
implications for the market equilibrium, i.e. after the liberalization of the product market has
taken place in period 1, but without environmental regulation. We construct the benchmark
case in such a way that entry of the rival firm on the output market is deterred. This allows an
analysis of the impact of environmental regulation on the market structure later on.
The policy-maker’s objective function – the welfare function W – is the sum of the consumer
surplus U and aggregate profit P of all firms minus a monetary measure of the damage D
arising from the use of the environmental harmful production factor E. Thus we have the
function for welfare:
) (C D U - + = P W (9)
with






D e = = ,








i = = = ￿ ￿ P P .
Z denotes the sum of provided capacities.
The profit component of the welfare function depends on the market structure after
liberalization. In order to secure that entry of the potential rival firm is deterred in market
equilibrium we have to investigate its entry decision. It would decide to enter the market after
liberalization has taken place if it can gain a non-negative profit.
Figure 3: Reaction functions of incumbent and rival firm
                                                
12  Its inverse is then a measure of the degree of X-inefficiency.
p Z
*





Figure 3 shows the reaction functions of the incumbent (ri) and of the rival firm (rp) and the
potential entrant’s isoprofit-curve of zero profit (
0
p I ). Since it is assumed to behave X-efficient
and as a Stackelberg-follower, the relevant output combination has to be on rp. Its profit is
given by the function
p p p p p i p F Z g Z Z Z - - - - = ) ˆ 1 ( p (10)
with  ( ) i o o i F g g Z 4 ) 1 ( 1
2
1 ˆ 2 - - + - = .
For the benchmark case we assume that the incumbent’s cost parameter yield - according to
equation (7) - the capacity  i Z ˆ¢ in Figure 3, i.e. entry of the rival is deterred through X-
inefficiency. Therefore, X-inefficiency reduces the number of market participants because it
results in an X-inefficiently high capacity.
The resulting effects of X-inefficiency on welfare are ambivalent. Without X-inefficiency
market entry would occur in period 1 because the capacity of the incumbent would be smaller
and would therefore allow for a positive profit of the rival firm. Whether the capacity in the
monopolistic, X-inefficient case is larger or smaller than in the dyopolistic case without any X-
inefficiency depends on the cost parameters (c.f. equation (7)). Should it be larger, higher
consumer surplus than in the efficient case results. A further positive effect on welfare arises
from larger profits in the monopolistic case. However, the larger capacity also results in a
higher environmental damage which in turn reduces welfare. The direction of the net effect is
ex-ante unclear and depends on the weight of the environmental damage in the welfare
function, i.e. on parameter d.
We now investigate the effects of environmental policies on market structure, environmental
damage, and welfare.
4. Environmental policies
We consider two kinds of environmental policies:
•  Regulation: The government requires all firms in the market to fulfill a production standard
eR that restricts the energy intensity of their production process. For the monopolistic firm
this necessitates a change in its production technology, i.e. to a new equipment with lower
energy intensity  R e e £ .
•  Taxation: The government taxes the use of the emission-generating resource E.
We begin with the first policy, which is essentially of the command-and-control type.
a. Command-and-control regulation
Proposition 1 :  Environmental command-and-control type regulation of an X-
inefficiently organized industry can increase the number of firms in the market and thus
increase economic efficiency.
The proof is outlined via the impact of the policy measure on the degree of X- inefficiency of
the monopolistic firm. Afterwards, its effect on the market structure will be investigated.___________________________________________________________________ IWH
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By assumption, the reduced energy intensity eR can only be achieved with a new production
technology. This entails a rise in fixed costs F because the new technology is either embodied
in capital goods which have to be bought or rented or requires expenditures on R&D.13






However, the new technology uses a smaller amount of energy per unit capacity and therefore
marginal costs are lower. Moreover, firms acquiring the new technology have to bear
adaptation costs Fa.
Figure 4 shows the profit curves and resulting X-inefficiencies both with and without the
imposition of the technological requirement. The index “1” stands for the situation without
environmental policy (i.e. under the old technology) and “2” for the policy-induced situation
(i.e. the new, environmentally friendlier technology).
The fixed costs the incumbent has to bear under a regulation policy (F2+Fa) are larger than in
the previous state without regulation ( F1). Therefore, the profit curves of both types of
managers lie below the profit curves without policy. Dependent on the changes of variable and
fixed costs, two cases can be distinguished. In case (a) the higher fixed costs reduce the
outsider-manager’s profit over the whole range of possible capacities, while the reduction in
variable costs is not large enough to compensate the higher fixed costs and adaptation costs.
Therefore, from the viewpoint of the insider the optimal capacity is reduced.
Figure 4: Monopolistic and X-inefficient capacity under regulation policy
(a) Additional cost burden for the incumbent firm
(b) Cost savings for the incumbent firm in case of large capacities
                                                
13 For this reason the new technology implies a smaller profit in the monopolistic case and is therefore not
implemented by the owner of the monopolistic firm in period 0.
*
1 i Z 1 ˆ
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A different situation arises in case (b). Here, the reduction in variable costs compensates for
large capacities the adaptation costs and the increase in fixed costs. The X-inefficient capacity
increases, since the profit making capabilities of the outsider-manager are enhanced and the
insider has to implement a higher capacity than before to protect his position.
















= < =  holds. The degree of X-inefficiency is less under the new
technology.
The change of the incumbent’s capacity influences the incentives of a rival firm to enter the
market. Its entry decision can be analyzed on the basis of Figure 5.
Figure 5: Fixed costs and adaptation costs and the market entry decision of the rival firm
*
1 i Z 1 ˆ































Figure 5 depicts different combinations of fixed costs (F2) and the adaptation costs ( Fa)
resulting from regulation with a given reduction in variable costs from g1 to g2. The reasonable
cost combinations are restricted to certain areas of the diagram. The lower bound of F2 is
given by the assumption that the fixed costs of the technology 2 are larger than those of
technology 1 (F1). In addition, all reasonable cost combinations have to lie above of the
negatively sloped line indicated by (F2 + F a)min. This line results from the condition that the
monopolistic profit is smaller under the new technology than under the old one. Further, the
sum of fixed and adaptation costs must be lower than (F2 + F a)max which is given by the
assumption that the outsider-manager can not make any positive profit at all. Values of (F2 +
Fa) larger than  (F2 + F a)max would imply that X-inefficiency would not exist within the
framework of this model.
These restrictions together define the area of relevant cost combiantions (A+B+C+D). The
area can be further subdivided into the parts (A+D) and (B+C): The negatively sloped line in
the middle is defined by the assumption that the profit of the monopolistic firm in an X-
inefficient situation is identical regardless of the technologies. Should the cost components
exceed 
2 1 ˆ ˆ 2 ) (
i i a F F
p p = +  a situation as shown in Figure 4(a) arises and the capacity of the
incumbent firm will be downsized as a response to the new regulation (areas A+D). If costs
do not surpass 
2 1 ˆ ˆ 2 ) (
i i a F F
p p = +  Figure 4(b) pictures the relevant situation with a rise in the
incumbent’s capacity (areas C+D).
Figure 5 shows that the decision on market entry of the rival firm depends on the ratio of fixed
costs F2 to adaptation costs Fa. Cost combinations resulting in indifference on behalf of the
rival firm between entrance and non entrance are given by the isoprofitcurve 
0
p I . This curve is
defined by
0 ) ˆ 1 ( 2 2 2 2 2 2 = - - - - = F Z g Z Z Z p p p p i p p , (11)
where Zp2 is the maximum of the potential entrant’s profit function (equation (12)) as a
Stackelberg-follower:
2








In the area (A+B) below 
0
p I  the profit of the rival firm in case of market entry is positive, in
the area above it is negative (C+D). The curve is positively sloped due to the asymmetric cost
burdens on the incumbent and the rival firm: Whereas the fixed costs are borne by both
competitors, the adaptation costs are borne only by the incumbent firm. With rising adaptation
costs, the capacity of the incumbent firm decreases (c.f. equation (7)) and the rival firm is now
able to obtain a positive profit. It will thus decide to enter the market even if the fixed costs F2
are slightly larger. Therefore, a technological production standard can induce market entrance
of the rival firm. The sum of the provided capacities rise and the economic efficiency enhances.
A necessary condition is that fixed costs are not too large compared to the adaptation costs.14
                                                
14 Rothfels (1999) shows that welfare can also increase should the enter be still deterred under a
regulatory scheme. The necessary condition for this result is an increase in the capacity of the
incumbent. This can come about when the cost combination lies in area  C of figure 5, whichIWH ___________________________________________________________________
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Next, we have to investigate whether this kind of regulation will also reduce emissions and
therefore produce a “double dividend”. The problem is obvious: On the one hand, the
regulation policy reduces the energy intensity per unit of capacity, while on the other hand, it
raises the number of firms and the sum of the provided capacities, which in turn will increase
the total use of the environmentally harmful resource E. Ex-ante it is therefore unclear whether
environmental quality will improve or even deteriorate. A similar problem arises regarding the
welfare implications. On the one hand, the increase in capacity has a positive effect on welfare.
On the other hand regulation will go along with lower profits with a corresponding negative
impact. The results of the following analysis are summarized in
Proposition 2: Environmental regulation of an X-inefficiently organized industry can
simultaneously improve environmental quality and raise welfare.
First we discuss the impact of regulation on environmental quality. A sufficient condition for
regulation to enhance environmental quality is that its impact on the energy intensity is large
enough so that the condition
) ˆ ( ˆ
2 2 1 1 p i R i Z Z Z + ‡e e (13)
is satisfied. In other words, the reduction of e to eR has to be sufficiently large. This will depend
on the characteristics of the environmentally friendlier technology and is a question that can
actually only be dealt with on the basis of empirical information about the costs involved with
the reduction of energy intensity. Nevertheless, our model does allow a more precise
statement since the fixed costs have a twofold influence which guarantees that condition (13)
can be satisfied. Higher fixed costs on the one hand result in a larger reduction of energy
intensity, and on the other hand induce a smaller increase in capacity. Therefore condition (13)
will be fulfilled if the fixed costs are relatively large.15
Taken together the results so far show that the fixed costs of the new technology display
diverging influences in the context of our model. As proposition 1 stated the new fixed costs
must not be too high for market entry to occur. On the other hand, they must not be too low
either, otherwise a reduction in the energy intensity will be not large enough to secure a
healthier environment. Numerical simulations produce evidence that reasonable parameter
constellations exist where market entry occurs and environmental quality enhances. Thus,
regulation can create a “double dividend”.
Now we turn to the impact of regulation on welfare. As we have just shown, the aggregate use
of energy will drop if the reduction in energy intensity is strong enough. The effect on the
consumer surplus depends on aggregate output. Under the conditions of proposition 1 we
know that the number of firms in the market will increase. This goes hand in hand with an
increase in the provided capacity, thus consumer surplus will rise. However, a negative impact
                                                                                                                                              
corresponds with Figure 4(b). Since the profit of the incumbent increases and, if the new technology is
clean enough, environmental quality improves, a “win-win” situation arises. For this see also Gabel and
Sinclair-Desgagné (1998).
In area D, welfare decreases because of shrinking capacity. However, in this case an improvement in
environmental quality occurs.
15 The numerical simulations given in the Appendix show different cost combinations and the
corresponding reduction of energy intensity resulting in a constant environmental quality.___________________________________________________________________ IWH
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on welfare arises out of the third determinant, i.e. the profit component. Since the incumbent
firm will lose its monopolistic position, its profit will be reduced. This loss can not be
compensated by the profit of the entrant as the sum of profits in the dyopoly case is lower than
the monopolistic profit. It remains to be shown that the positive effects are not outweighted by
the loss in profit. Again, our numerical simulations show that this can be the case and that
environmental regulation can result in welfare increases if the fixed costs F2 are not too high.16
b. Taxation
We now turn to the impact of the second possible policy measure mentioned above, i.e.
taxation of the environmental harmful resource. We assume that the tax policy consists of a tax
rate t which raises the factor price of E from e to e + t.17 This will induce firms to shift away
from the use of E. Taxation results in an increase of marginal costs from gi to git with
i i g g
1 ) 1 (
b
t t + = .  (14)
The results of our analysis are summerized in
Proposition 3: A “green” tax policy which taxes the use of the emission-generating
resource E (and thus raises marginal production costs g) increases the number of firms
in the market.
First, we have to ask about the impacts of taxation on X-inefficiency. As for the command-
and-control type of regulation, the tax on E reduces the insider’s and the outsider’s profit (c.f.
Figure 6). The monopolistic output of the incumbent is reduced and consequently X-






This depends on fixed costs and the productivity disadvantage of the outsider being not too
large.18 However, the reduction could be smaller than under command-and-control regulation.
The reason for this lies in the lesser pressure felt by the incumbent. Therefore, the insider’s
possibilities to reduce X-inefficiency are less than under a regulatory policy.
Figure 6: Monopolistic and X-inefficient capacity under taxation
                                                
16 In the different simulations in the Appendix the environmental quality remains unchanged. This allows
us to compare the impact of the policy measure on the other welfare components. However, it has to be
kept in mind that the requirements for the reduction of energy intensity are different for the different
cost combinations. This can be seen by a comparison of DF and De in the last two rows of Table 2a in
the Appendix.
17 In what follows, variables after taxation are characterized by index t.
18 For the proof see Rothfels (1999).IWH ___________________________________________________________________
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Second, we have to turn to the effects of taxation on the entry decision of the rival firm.
Taxation will induce market entry if the profit of the rival firm
F Z g Z Z Z p p p p i p - - - - = t t t t t t p ) ˆ 1 ( (15)
is positive. The marginal costs of the potential entrant (gpt) equal the marginal costs of the
incumbent firm (git). The first order condition for profit maximizing yields the capacity
2








Taxation has two conflicting impacts on the market entry decision. On the one hand, the
capacity of the incumbent shrinks. Market entry therefore becomes more attractive. On the
other hand, the entrant’s marginal costs rise which has a negative impact. It can be shown that
the positive effect always dominates (see Appendix 2b).
To summarize: Taxation can reduce X-inefficiency and increase the number of market
participants. It yet remains to be discussed whether a green tax policy can also create a
”double dividend” by simultaneously improving the quality of the environment and whether it
results in welfare improvements.
Proposition 4:  An environmental tax policy can increase environmental quality and
welfare. However, the welfare gain may be smaller than under regulation, depending on
the cost increase of a regulatory scheme.
Again, the influences on environmental quality are divergent. Since the number of market
participants increases the total use of the harmful production factor  E grows, too.
Environmental quality is only enhanced if the condition
t t p i i E E E + ‡ ˆ ˆ (17)
is satisfied. The quantities of E can be derived from the constrained factor demands which in
turn can be derived from the production function in equation (1). Before taxation factor
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Afterwards it is for the incumbent
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These relations allow for the derivation of a minimum tax rate dependent on the assumed
production function assuring that environmental quality does not deteriorate.19 Taxing the
resource E will improve the quality of the environment, if the tax rate exceeds this minimum
level.
Taking the results together, we obtained two positive effects on welfare under the condition of
a certain minimal tax rate. Capacity and consumer surplus increase while environmental
damage decreases. However, analogous to the before examined command-and-control
regulation we also obtain a negative effect on the sum of the firms’ profits. For this reason the
tax rate can not exceed a certain upper limit if a welfare increase is to result. Again, numerical
simulations show that a range of values of the tax rate exist which allow for a welfare increase.
However, depending on the cost parameters of the new technology, the welfare gain might be
larger if a command-and-control policy is implemented.20
5. Conclusions
The aim of this paper has been to show that in the case of X-inefficient organized firms
environmental policy measures can enhance environmental quality and equally raise the
efficiency of domestic firms and of the market outcome. This we call a “double dividend”.
For this purpose we developed a model that allows the investigation of the impact of
environmental policy measures on X-inefficient firms. The driving force for the double dividend
is reduced X-inefficiency and stronger competition on the output market. Positive welfare
effects arise, as aggregate output increases with benefits to consumers. These positive effects
can occur under a tax policy as well as under a command-and-control policy.
A further implication of our model concerns the relation of the welfare effects of taxation and
of a command-and-control policy. In other models that deal only with allocative inefficiencies,
command-and-control policies are usually shown to be inferior if compared to incentive-based
policies, e.g. taxation. However, we showed that this evaluation may differ if one allows for
additional inefficiencies such as X-inefficiency. The outcome depends on the fixed and
adaptation costs of an environmental friendlier technology under the command-and-control
                                                
19 The necessary tax rate tmin under which environmental quality remains unchanged is given in Table 2b
in the Appendix.
20 See the ranking list in Tables 1, 2a and 2b in the Appendix.IWH ___________________________________________________________________
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policy. Under special circumstances, i.e. when the fixed costs and the adaptation costs of the
new technology are not too large and the ratio of fixed to adaptation costs is relatively small, a
command-and-control policy can result in a higher welfare gain.___________________________________________________________________ IWH
19
Appendix 1: Results of numerical simulations









1 i p 0,190696
go2 0,29 g1 0,7160192
gp1 0,1 CS 0,233047
gp2 0,09 D 0,233047 
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The parameter values of the benchmark case are determined as follows: The values for the
marginal costs of technology 1 are given exogenously. This allows the derivation of the fixed
costs under which the potential entrant receives zero profit. For this, the equations
( ) F g g Z o o i 4 ) 1 ( 1
2
1 ˆ 2 - - + - =  ,
0 ) ˆ 1 ( = - - - - = p p p p p i p F Z g Z Z Z p
and
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are solved simultaneously. Then the values of the other variables can be determined according
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Table 2a: Impact of command-and-control regulation assuming that environmental damage
remains unchanged (the columns indicate the different cost combinations in Figure A.5)
Parameter B A2 A3 A1 C D A4
F2 0,012 0,012 0,013 0,012 0,013 0,015 0,012
Fa 0,005 0,008 0,008 F1 0,005 0,005 0,02
2 i Z ˆ 0,685189 0,680615 0,679076 0,674721 0,683672 0,680615 0,661635
Zp2 0,112405 0,114693 0,115462 0,11764 - - 0,124183
S Z 0,797594 0,795308 0,794538 0,792361 0,683672 0,680615 0,785818
*
2 i p 0,190025 0,187025 0,186025 0,183221 0,189025 0,187025 0,175025
2 i p ˆ  (Mon.) 0,137038 0,136123 0,135815 0,134944 0,136734 0,136123 0,132327
g2 0,721158 0,727833 0,73009 0,7365 0,723364 0,72783 0,756046
2 i p ˆ  (Dyo.) 0,060019 0,058062 0,057408 0,05557 - - 0,050164
pp2 0,000635 0,001154 0,000332 0,001839 - - 0,003421
S p 0,060654 0,059216 0,057739 0,057409 0,136734 0,136123 0,053585
CS 0,318078 0,316257 0,315645 0,313918 0,233704 0,231618 0,305477


















































Ranking I II IV V VI VIII IX
DF (in vH) 1,66 1,66 10,13 1,66 10,13 27,08 1,66
De (in vH) -14,4 -14,2 -14,1 -13,8 -0,14 +0,003 -12,7
Compared to the benchmark case welfare increased in points A1, A2, A3, B, and C. In B and
A2 the welfare increase is larger under a regulatory command-and-control policy than under
taxation.
Table 2b: Impact of taxation
b1 = 0,1 und b2 = 0,9
t i Z ˆ 0,681037
t p Z 0,108666
S Z 0,789703
D Z 15,67 vH
tmin 0,175579















Appendix 2: Analytical proofs
a. Principal-Agent problem
To derive the X-inefficient capacity we solve the manager’s decision problem backwards, thus
starting in the last period T (see also Kamecke (1993)).
In T the firm operates with the capacity ZT which was ordered in period T-1. The owner
continues to employ the manager of the previous period (the insider) if the insider offers him a
contract  ) , ( , , T i T i w a which satisfies
( ) ) ( ) ( ) ( , , , T o T i T i T i T i T i Z Z w Z w p p p a - £ - + .
This means that the insider’s wage w and profit share a are equal to or smaller than the
additional profit the firm receives if the insider is employed instead of an outsider.
In equilibrium the insider will receive exactly the difference between the firm’s profit under his
management and the profit under the outsider’s management:
( ) )} ( ; 0 max{ ) ( ) ( , , , T o T i T i T i T i T i Z Z w Z w p p p a - = - + . (i)
In T-1 the insider tries to maximize his next period pay-off, given in equation (i). Thus, he
orders the capital stock  T Z ˆ  to maximize the right hand side of equation (i):
)} ( ; 0 max{ ) ( : ) ( Z Z Z o i p p D - = .
Since in T-1 the insider could be undercut by an outsider we have to take the outsider’s offer
into account. This can consist of a side payment to the owner. The outsider will be willing to
work at  ) , ( 1 , 1 , - - T o T o w a if this side payment to the owner is not larger than the pay-off he
receives as an insider in period T (i.e. if the owner hires him instead of the insider). Therefore
we can derive the following condition for the outsider’s offer:
( ) T i T o T o T o T o Z w Z w , 1 , 1 1 , 1 , ˆ ) ( D p a - ‡ - + - - - - .
The insider will be rehired in period T-1 if he proposes a profit share and wage  ) , ( 1 , 1 , - - T i T i w a
such that the pay-off the owner will receive if he rehires the insider is larger than if he hires an
outsider. This yields the following condition for the insider’s salary in T-1:
( ) ) ˆ ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , T i T i o T i T i i T i Z Z w Z D p p a + ‡ - - - - - - .
In equilibrium equality holds, and the condition can be transformed into
( ) ) ˆ ( ) ( ) ( , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , T i T i T i T i i T i T i Z Z w Z w D D p a - = - + - - - - - .
This expression is again maximal for  T , i T , i Z ˆ Z ˆ = -1 . The same applies for all remaining periods
save the first one: In the first period all potential managers bid to become the insider for the
remaining periods. We assume that they are willing to offer their first period salary and their
last period pay-off in order to be hired. One of them is chosen by the owner in a random
fashion.
b. Impact of taxation on the market entry decision of the potential rival
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. (ii)
Market entry occurs if expression (19) has a positive sign. Proving this requires several steps:
The impact of the taxation on the capacities of the incumbent and the potential entrant is
0


















































































holds. With equation (iii) one can show that this is true. Equation (ii) simplifies to
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and one can show that this condition is positive if
F g g g i i o - > - - ) 1 )( ( t t t
holds. This condition is always satisfied.IWH ___________________________________________________________________
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